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Intro/Background
• There is a growing concern that aircraft
vulnerability analysis is not being given due
consideration
• Stealth has had a rising importance, with
susceptibility overshadowing vulnerability
• Warfighters, planners, and requirements setters
would rather have an aircraft that cannot be hit,
but still need to look at what will happen when it
is hit.
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NDIA Vulnerability Report
• Points raised:
– Need for Robust Analysis
– Need for new or alternative Measures of Merit
– Need a process to advance information from detailed
level to mission and theater level of operation.
• “Early incorporation of Low Vulnerability (LV)
design features are less costly than later retrofit”
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Vulnerability and Design
• Conceptual design for vulnerability is usually
accomplished through guidelines
• Usually vulnerability modeling and simulation
isn’t addressed until more detailed level of design
• Like any discipline,
more information
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Design at ASDL
 (Aerospace Systems Design Laboratory)
• Focused on enabling the designer or decision
maker to create the best system
• Use a number of methods to assist in this task
– Response Surface Methodology (RSM)
– Robust Methods
– Technology Identification, Evaluation, and Selection
(TIES)
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Response Surface Equation (RSE)
•Used to model complex analysis in a simple manner
Prediction Profile
•Used to visualize the relationships
between design variables and
response values
Screening Test
•Used to determine which
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Technology Identification, Evaluation, and Selection
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What is Missing?
• These methods can handle robust scenarios, and allow
for modeling of technology
• Fall prey to following problems when applied to
vulnerability
– Lack of Analysis Methodology
• There must be a way to accurately perform vulnerability
analysis and transform the detailed information into the
appropriate level metrics
– Lack of Appropriate Measures of Effectiveness (MOE)
• If MOEs are not descriptive enough to show effects of
technologies or design decisions, then ASDL methods
will not help
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Vulnerability/Lethality Taxonomy
• Method developed at Army Research Lab by Deitz
and others
• Provides a way to pass information from initial
conditions of threat/target interaction up to theater
level analysis
• Divides vulnerability information up into a series
of Levels that are linked by Operators
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Level Descriptions
Level 2 Level 2:  Damage description: usually a list of
components with a damage status of each one
Level 3
Level 3:  System capability:  a list of system
capability metrics, and the level at which the
damaged system stands
Level 4
Level 4:  Battlefield utility:  usually a list of
mission or theatre level MOEs relating to the
performance of the system
Level 1
Level 1:  Threat and target system initial
conditions: this includes geometry, locations,
velocities, etc.
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Level Details
Level 2
Space: all possible damage
configurations for the
given threat-target pair
Vectors: Lists of all
components modeled
and their damage stateSample Vector:
(  = killed
   = undamaged)
 Engine
 Fuel Tank
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O1,2 :  Transforms initial conditions into list of
damaged components, typically physics-based.
Can use codes like COVART or AJEM
Operator (O2,3)
O2,3 :  Transforms list of damaged components into
system capabilities, typically engineering-based.
One method developed by ARL is the Degraded
States Vulnerability Method (DSVM)
Operator (O3,4)
O3,4 :  Transforms system capabilities into battlefield
utility.  Must be a collaboration between
vulnerability analyst and campaign analyst.
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Benefits from Taxonomy
• Structured Method
– Lays work out in series of defined steps
– Develops terminology to describe these steps that aids
in describing the problem
• Design Oriented
– Allows different operators to be used given the fidelity
of analysis necessary.
– Could be automated to allow ease of analysis
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Benefits from Taxonomy
• System Capability Level
– Allows more information to be collected about the
effect of damage on the aircraft.
– For Tanks, might have Mobility, Firepower,
Communications, Acquisition, Crew, and Ammunition.
– For Aircraft have to look at things differently, Mobility
or Control kill causes kill of entire Aircraft!
– Use Kill criteria and levels as possible measures of
capability
– Keep track of crew lives
– Communications, Weaponry, Targeting important in
modern systems.
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Weaknesses of Taxonomy
• Still detail intensive
– Need to know components, not a Conceptual design
problem
• Limited to tool accuracy
– Uses existing analysis capability
• Work in progress
– O3,4 and Level 4 have not been defined fully, until this
is finished, the method is not complete
Matthew C. Largent
Georgia Institute of Technology
Atlanta, GA  30332-0150
www.asdl.gatech.edu 18Aircraft Survivability 2000, Monterey, CA
Current Taxonomy Work
• Defining Level 4 and O3,4
– Task-oriented mission definition
– Threats degrade capability
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Current Taxonomy Work
• Top-down analysis
– Looking at using mission definition at theater level to
define capabilities and components necessary to
complete mission
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Current Taxonomy Work
• System of systems representation
– Model each system as a series of components
– Communication between systems is a capability
– Destruction of communication components would then
degrade the capability of the systems to act together
– With Top-Down analysis, allows possibility of mission
resolution to be found with a number of systems.
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Conclusions
• Vulnerability/Lethality Taxonomy provides a
method of classifying and propagating
vulnerability information that can be beneficial to
the aircraft community
• Focusing on capability will provide information
on effects of damage or LV technology beyond PK
• Keeping track of information, such as which
components are killed, will benefit designers
– Also track crew lives
• Combined with advanced design methods,
tradeoffs can be performed to find “Best” solution
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Future Work Possibilities
• As a system is examined earlier in the design
process, how will operators and levels change to
allow vulnerability analysis to be performed?
• What specifics need to be addressed to assist in
applying the V/L Taxonomy to aircraft?
– How should capabilities be defined for aircraft, and
how should they be calculated?
• What could be done to existing analysis programs
and the V/L Taxonomy to make them more design
oriented?
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